Biodiversity Agreements

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Coalitions of 2 members, including C12, have the best payment in the world. Not surprisingly, we find that trade is more efficient when the countries involved are different. Our model makes a new contribution to the literature on international biodiversity protection by (1) unravelling a natural ceiling for nature protection in each country in combination with a hyperbolic cost function, (2) integrating local benefits of nature protection for the representation of the different scales on which biodiversity benefits are perceived, and (3) the subadditivity characteristic of the global conservation function. For a more complete analysis, we examine these characteristics in the hypothesis of both symmetric and asymmetric countries and we also take into account the transfers that could be made by an international market for biodiversity credits. We focus on these characteristics to examine their impact on the stability of coalitions and the possibilities for effective biodiversity agreements for biodiversity conservation. The second feature of our model is the integration of the local benefits of biodiversity protection in addition to the overall benefits of nature protection. With the benefits of protecting global nature (which is a public good), countries enjoy local and secondary benefits from their local biodiversity protection. The benefits of local nature protection may vary from country to country. Improved recreational opportunities, improved air quality, lower ambient temperature and improved health are some of the secondary benefits that can be perceived locally as a nature conservation activity (Elmqvist 2012).

From the analysis, we find that: that cooperation between countries in a game of bipartite asymmetry is robust with regard to changes in (1) the maximum degree of global conservation of biodiversity (left ({overline {G}} right)) and (2) species management in each country (left ({bar {q} } right)), but positively related to the increase in local benefits of nature protection – (left (alpha right). ) Even though the local benefits of nature protection nature protection are more important. Resulting in larger coalitions, they do not necessarily lead to more effective AES. This is because the additional incentives to maintain are due to significant local benefits, regardless of a country`s participation in an EIA. Therefore, in this case, the benefits of cooperation in a large stable IEA are relatively small compared to cases where local benefits are low. Asymmetry between countries has been studied in the IEA literature. . . .